ABSTRACT Data privacy protection is crucial to cloud computing since privacy leakage may prevent users from using cloud services. To ensure data privacy, we propose PriGuarder, a novel privacy-aware access control method. This method spans the three stages of a cloud service, i.e., user registration, data creation, and data access. At each stage, users can choose two modes to interact with the cloud service provider, i.e., direct or indirect. With the indirect mode, an attribute fuzzy grouping scheme is introduced to ensure user identity privacy and attribute privacy in all the three stages. Furthermore, exploiting data encryption and timestamp techniques, new access control protocols are proposed to regulate interactions between users and the cloud service provider. We illustrate the use of our method in the context of Amazon S3. Theoretical analysis and comprehensive simulation experiments have been conducted, which demonstrate the efficacy of PriGuarder.
I. INTRODUCTION
In cloud computing, user data may contain user privacy, such as enterprise customer information, hospital patient information, and users dating [1] - [3] , and hence should be well protected. In addition, a malicious cloud service provider (CSP) or an attacker could intercept users' operations and then access user identity information or tamper user data, which may result in serious consequences [4] . Therefore, it is crucial to ensure user privacy in cloud computing. Access control has been considered as an effective solution to ensure user privacy [5] .
However, designing access control is particularly challenging in the cloud computing setting. First, most of the traditional approaches ensure user identity privacy by using attribute-based techniques, which fail to protect user attribute privacy. Second, it still has the risk of identity disclosure by correlation analysis of user attribute information. Third, the access control methods commonly used can't ensure the reliability of anonymous users. An attacker can still obtain data in the cloud by pretending to be a legitimate user.
There have been a lot of research efforts. In [1] , [6] - [8] , attribute-based encryption (ABE) methods were proposed to protect cloud data privacy. By associating keys for encryption and decryption with users' attribute set, ABE can protect data privacy in the cloud and improve the flexibility of access control. But it has required users to provide their attribute certificates, and failed to protect user attribute privacy. Aimed at the problem, [9] - [13] have put forward some anonymous access control (AAC) methods. However, the existing AAC methods are achieved by group authentication methods and fails to realize on-demand fee [12] . [14] - [17] have proposed some privacy protection methods by combining the advantages of ABE and AAC, but these works still ignore the privacy disclosure on users' attribute. For example, suppose that a FBI member uses cloud storage service and accesses his data in the cloud by providing his FBI credentials, an attacker can learn the users' FBI attribute and pose a threat to his data when the attacker can monitor the user's operations on access to cloud. In addition, there have been a lot of people who upload their personal diaries or photos to cloud storage servers, which are offered by Baidu, Yahoo and other Internet companies. In order to complete registration, people are often required to provide some information such as graduate school, work place and so on. Although a cloud user does not provide identity information, an attacker may obtain the user's exact identity by data mining and correlation analysis techniques of his attribute information.
In response to the limitations with existing approaches, we propose a novel Privacy-aware Access Control method based on Attribute Fuzzy Grouping, called PriGuarder. This method spans the three stages of a cloud service, i.e., user registration, data creation and data access. At each stage, it provides user two kinds of interaction -direct mode or indirect mode. With the indirect mode, an Attribute Fuzzy Grouping (AFG) scheme is introduced to ensure user identity privacy and attribute privacy. Furthermore, exploiting data encryption and timestamp techniques, new access control protocols are proposed to regulate interaction between users and the cloud service providers. We illustrate the use of our method in the context of Amazon S3. Our principal contributions are summarized below.
• Based on trusted third party (TTP) privacy protection framework, PriGuarder can not only support real-name access but also guarantee anonymous access control.
• PriGuarder leverages an AFG technique, which can realize the attribute-based access control and also support user attribute privacy protection. This issue has been ignored by most of existing AAC schemes.
• Rigid theoretical analysis as well as experimental evaluation have been presented to show the effectiveness of PriGuarder with respect to privacy protection. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents related work. In Section III, we present the problem description. Section IV gives the design details of the proposed method. Section V gives an example to illustrate the use of the proposed method. In Section VI, we present theoretical analysis on the proposed method. In Section VII, the experimental results are discussed. In Section VIII, we conclude the paper and present some future work.
II. RELATED WORK
Existing privacy protection approaches for cloud computing can be divided into three categories, i.e., ABE, AAC or hybrid.
Goyal et al. [18] proposed an ABE technology, where user's public key and private key are associated with user's attributes. In the aspect of ABE researches, there are two kinds of schemes: Key-policy ABE (KP-ABE) [18] and Ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-ABE) [19] , [20] . In KP-ABE, data is stored in the cloud server with encryption. The user, who wants to access data, must match his attributes and keys with those sent by attribute authority. In CP-ABE, user identity is expressed as a set of user attributes and encrypted data is associated with access control structure. The user who wants to access data must follow an access protocol based on a kind of tree structure, which makes attributes as tree's leaves and have AND, OR and Other as the thresholds of monotone access structures. Whether user unlock the ciphertext or not depends on his attributes matched the corresponding access protocol structure. Zhang and Chen [6] proposed a HDFSbased attribute encryption method, which combines a proxy re-encryption with inert reinsurance confidential method and can reduce in the computational cost of the data owner. Huang et al. [7] proposed a multi-role user access control solution by employing attribute-based encryption technique. Nabeel and Bertino [8] proposed an incremental encryption technology to reduce the re-encrypting costs caused by the change of access control policy. Chase and Chow [22] proposed a multi-certified ABE method, where multiple KDCs are coordinated by a unified authority that assign attributes and keys to users. Lin et al. [23] proposed a multi-authority ABE protocol without the need for a credible authority. However, it requires multiple KDC with full knowledge of each user properties. Lewko and Waters [24] put forward a decentralized ABE method, which doesn't require a trusted server and users can have multiple attributes. Green et al. [25] proposed a decrypt task agent method to reduce the computation overhead. Compared with the distributed ways, this approach that combines a single agent with a centralized KDC still needs to verify users' identity and don't meet the demand of the user's anonymous access.
To support anonymous access, Yang et al. [9] adopted a centralized KDC access control method to support user authentication. Maji et al. [10] raised an attribute-based authentication and centralized KDC AAC method, and used distributed KDC to implement anonymous access in [11] . However, the work mentioned above ignore the issues caused by anonymous access. Under anonymous access, it is difficult for cloud service providers to confirm the misuse of resources.
Some other researchers have presented comprehensive technical solutions that make full use of the advantage of both attributes-based encryption and anonymous access. For example, Jensen et al. [12] presented a data anonymization method to prevent cloud service providers from abusing user data. Meanwhile, the work has achieved reliable AAC and accountability by adopting a ring and group signature technique. In view of the DaaS, Jia et al. [14] presented a method to protect user privacy on the premise without TTP. Yang and Jia [15] proposed a privacy protection scheme based on multi-authority CP-ABE, which can solve the problem of attribute revocation. Gao [3] and Fan [4] also presented ABE methods to protect user identity privacy. However, all the work discussed above take a set of user attribute information as his ID, there still exists a problem of attributes privacy leakage. 
III. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION AND PRELIMINARY

A. SYSTEM MODEL
In general, a cloud service system include three kinds of entities, cloud users, cloud service provider (CSP) and Trusted Third party (TTP). The cloud user is the party that utilizes cloud service, for example, retrieving the specific data, getting the computing results, and accessing the shared data. The CSP has significant storage space and computation capacities, and is responsible for providing all the aforementioned services and implementing access control to the cloud data. The TTP is responsible for regulating of CSP's performance or QoS. For instance, a TTP like TapInSystems, TechOut and Hyperic can detect the performance of amazon's S3, such as service availability, response time, throughput, etc. And a TTP also can be responsible for providing the third party payment service, such as Alipay [26] is used to realize the third-party payment by Baidu Cloud in China. Besides, there also exist some other TTPs that can offer certain privacy protection service. For example, Chrome cloud browser has provided a third-party cookies service, which can prevent cloud service websites recording users' personal information and pushing them to CSPs by cookies.
There are two modes,direct interaction or interaction based on the TTP, in current cloud computing applications. In the direct interaction, as shown in Fig. 1 (a) , users directly request cloud resources from a CSP, and the CSP responses the request after it has completed user identity authentication. This mode is more suitable to small and medium enterprises that plan to build a private cloud environment, like VSPEX -Eblock offered by EMC. In the interaction based on the TTP, as shown in Fig. 1 (b) , the cloud resource requests and responses between users and CSPs need help from a TTP.
In this paper, a TTP is introduced to do similar things and users are allowed to choose the above two interaction modes on demand. Either way, users can create data and declare others' access mode and permissions to data that he has created. Our main goal is to propose a privacy-aware access control method, where users' identity and attribute privacy can be protected under the support of TTP.
To apply our approach, the following reasonable assumptions must hold.
• CSPs are honest but may be curious, which may view user data information contents out of curiosity, but not modify users' data.
• CSPs and TTPs must not collude.
• Attribute-based access control techniques are used in cloud environments.
• Users' access rights to data in cloud include read, write, read-only and write-only.
• All data exchange between entities (i.e., CSPs and users, or TTPs and users) are protected by security protocols.
B. PRELIMINARY OF AFG-BASED ACCESS CONTROL POLICY
We have made formal description on attribute-based access control policy in our previous work [27] , where S stands for access subject set,Astands for operation set,O stands for access object set. Taking s ∈ S as an example, s is described by a tuple (sa 1 , sa 2 , . . . , sa l ), where
and Dom(SA i ) is denoted as the value domain of subjects' ith attribute. In this paper, we propose an attribute fuzzy grouping (AFG) scheme to group an access entity's attribute faintly and distribute each access entity a fuzzy identity. The basic idea is to increase the difficulty where the specific attribute information of cloud users can be deduced by malicious CSPs or other attackers. That means, if there are no attackers can find the exact attribute information, user attribute privacy is protected. We will introduce the corresponding scheme in Section IV. Here we give definitions of terms and symbols. AFG-based access control policy is a kind of extension from attribute-based access control policy. Based on our previous work [27] , we firstly define fuzzy grouping domain of subject's attribute as follows.
Definition 1:
is called a division of value domain of subjects' ith attribute and Dom(SA i ) j denotes the jth branch.
Secondly, based on Definition 1, we can define a subject group and its number GID as follows.
Definition 2: Given a set of partition {SATD i |i = 1, . . . , l}, for a subject group SG, if its first attribute value set is Dom(SA 1 ) x , . . . , the lth attribute value set is Dom(SA l ) z , where Dom(SA 1 ) x ∈ SATD 1 , · · · , Dom(SA l ) z ∈ SATD l , then the subject group can be expressed as SG = SG x,y,...,z and the group number GID can be denoted by x, y, . . . , z.
Further, in a subject group, a subjects' unique group identity GUID is defined as follows.
Definition 3: If a subject In this paper, a subjects' group number GID and group identity GUID is only decided by the proposed AFG scheme. Thus, we can define the fuzzy identification of a subject as follows.
Definition 4: Suppose that a subject s = s i ∈ SG x,y,...,z , then s can be uniquely marked with both his group number GID and group identity GUID. The tuple (GID, GUID), where GID = x, y, . . . , z, GUID = i, is called as the fuzzy identification of the subject s.
Without loss of generality, we can define an objects' fuzzy identification similar to the above definitions.
Finally, we can define AFG-based access control policy as follows.
Definition 5: If a subject s i ∈ SG x,y,...,z is allowed to use an operation a j on a object o j ∈ OG u,v,...,w , then the access control policy can be expressed as
where s i ∈ SG x,y,...,z and o j ∈ OG u,v,...,w embody entities' fuzzy identification. In this paper, the above access control policy is produced at the data creation stage and is used at the data access stage. Based on the above policy, users can access cloud data without concealing their own identity and attribute information.
IV. DESIGN OF PRIGUARDER A. OVERVIEW
PriGuarder spans the three stages of a cloud service, i.e., user registration, data creation and data access. In each stage, users are allowed to interact directly or indirectly. In indirect mode, a scheme based on attribute fuzzy grouping is introduced to protect users' identity and attribute privacy. The concrete process is shown in Fig. 2 .
In user registration stage, users can choose a direct or anonymous registration mode. In the anonymous registration mode, TTP is responsible for converting a user identity based on AFG scheme and sends the converting result (the user's fuzzy identification) to CSPs. With the help of users' fuzzy identification list, CSPs can realize anonymous access control.
In data creation stage, users can choose to create data directly or anonymously, and can set the access mode to their data such as direct access or anonymous access.
For direct creation mode, when data owners hope their data to be accessed directly, they initiate the request of data creation, submit their data and a statement on data access rights to CSPs. CSPs generate the access control policy based on data owners' statement on access rights. When data owners hope their data accessed anonymously, they submit a statement on data access rights to TTP. TTP converts this statement into an AFG-based access control policy and sends the policy with data to CSPs.
For anonymous creation mode, when data owners hope their data to be accessed anonymously, they initiate the request of data creation, submit their data and a statement on data access rights to TTP. TTP stores data, converts the statement into an AFG-based access control policy. And then TTP transmits the request, sends data and the AFG-based policy with data to CSPs. When data owners allow their data to be accessed directly or real-namely, they submit their data and a statement on data access rights to TTP. TTP transmits the request, sends data and the statement to CSPs. CSPs generate the access control policy of data based on data owners' statement.
In data access stage, user can choose to access data directly or anonymously. In anonymous access mode, TTP converts user identity in the request based on AFG scheme and forwards the new request to CSPs. CSPs respond to the user's request.
To sum up, all above three stages need the AFG scheme stated in section IV.B. In addition, exploiting data encryption and timestamp techniques at data creation and data access stages, new access control protocols are proposed to regulate direct and indirect interactions between users and CSPs. The protocols will be stated in section IV.C.
B. AFG SCHEME
In PriGuarder, the AFG scheme is the key to protect user privacy, including those from their data, identity and attributes. The AFG scheme introduces a new kind of attribute-based grouping rule. The grouping concept has appeared in group encryption scheme [28] , where it produces a common group key which can only be used by group members to decrypt a sharing information. But the AFG scheme is completely different with [28] . The goal of attribute-based grouping is to ensure CSPs have no information about cloud users' attributes during the three stages of a cloud service, i.e., user registration, data creation and data access. First, an attribute value can be conversed as an ASCII tuple. Second, an attribute group number is computed and assigned to the attribute value through linear or nonlinear operation on its ASCII tuple under the control of an operational factor Key. Finally, a users' fuzzy identification is achieved by aggregating all the attribute group numbers of his attribute values.
To be convenient for explanation, f (S Attr ) is unified to express the grouping rule of subject attribute S Attr later. That means, if a subject s = (sa 1 , sa 2 , . . . , sa l ) ∈ S Attr , f (s) = f ((sa 1 , sa 2 , . . . , sa l )) = GID where GID = x, y, . . . , z is defined in Definition 4. f (S Attr ) works as follows.
1) ASCII CONVERSION
For each attribute value sa i (i = 1, . . . , l, l ∈ N ), sa i is represented as a character string tuple with n i characters as a group and denoted by (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a j ) , where if the final character string a j is less than n i and then its tail up to 0. Furthermore, (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a j ) is conversed as an ASCII tuple (b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b j ) where b t (t = 1, . . . , j) is an ASCII matched witha t (t = 1, . . . , j).
For example, suppose that a user's value of Country Attribute is American, the attribute value can be expressed as (Ameri, can00) with 5 characters as a group. And then the VOLUME 6, 2018 character string tuple (Ameri, can00) can be conversed as an ASCII tuple (65110101114105, 99971104848).
2) DOUBLE MODULO OPERATORS
For each attribute value sa i (i = 1, . . . , l, l ∈ N ), the attribute group number g i of sa i is computed as the following formula.
where (b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b j ) is the ASCII tuple of sa i , Key is the operational factor, W i is the expected group number of the ith subject attribute type and % is the modulo operator. Thus, all attribute values with the same g i can constitute an attribute group. As stated in Definition 1, the group should be a division branch of subjects' ith attribute value domain. In order to improve the computational complexity of f (S Attr ), we take prime numbers as Key. It should be pointed out that there may be different n i and W i for different attribute type i in f (S Attr ).
3) GENERATION OF GID
The GID of a subject s GID = x, y, . . . , z can be generated by combining all g i (i = 1, . . . , l) together, where
In order to protect users' attribute privacy, we should make it difficult for attackers to deduce the exact attribute value of users from their GIDs. Therefore, we introduce two parameters complexity threshold S and security thresholdP into AFG scheme.
Complexity threshold S is used to improve the difficulty of finding an attribute value matched with user in an attribute group. Suppose that a users' group number is GID = x, y, . . . , z, where the numbers of attribute values in the corresponding attribute group are q x , q y , . . . , q z respectively, then the largest matching times of finding the users' all attribute values is N = z i=x q i and the computation complexity O(N ) > S. Usually, the threshold S is set on the performance of machine used to matching calculation. For instance, if a computer can match 10 8 times per second, then it will match 8.64×10 12 per day. At this time, Sshould be greater than 8.64×10 12 .
Security threshold P is mainly used to control the entity proportion whose attributes will not be leaked in Cloud environment. After f (S Attr ) ends, users with the same GID can form an entity group. Suppose that there are Rentity groups in the whole Cloud system. In an entity group, CSP has the same computation complexity of matching any user and his attribute values on the premise of knowing GID. Let O(N ) > S be the computation complexity. If there are Q entity groups where their computation complexity O(N ) > S, then Q/R reflects the entity proportion where attributes will not be leaked in the whole Cloud system. Obviously, we expect Q/R > P where P is a percentage such as 95%. If Q/R < P, it needs to make more entity groups with O(N ) > S. Based on the above introduction, it must reduce W i to increase q i . Thus, it need to reset f (S Attr ) until Q/R > P meets.
The attribute fuzzy grouping algorithm is shown in Table 1 .
In PriGuarder, the main function of AFG scheme embodies as follows. First, entity identity is converted into a fuzzy identification. Second, a general access control policy is converted into AFG-based access control policy by using fuzzy identification to replace subject entity in anonymous access statement. Third, a common user request is converted into an AFG-based request by replacing subject entity in the request with fuzzy identification. Here takes user's entity conversion as an example, the process is shown in Fig. 3 .
C. INTERACTIVE PROTOCOL OF ACCESS OF ACCESS CONTROL
Since cloud users are allowed to choose different data creation and access modes, there are different access interactive protocols in cloud. The protocols are provided in this section and used to regulate the interaction among users, TTP and CSP. Here we first give the explanation of symbols used in the protocols, as shown in Table 2 .
1) DATA CREATION STAGE
a. When Owner create data directly, the interaction is shown in Fig. 4 (a) . b. When Owner create data anonymously, the interaction is shown in Fig. 4 (b) .
Owner sends a request to the TTP for creating MSG; 2. TTP gives Owner a C_o according to the Owners'
grouping results R, and uses C_o as Owners' proof to ask SKs from KDCs; 3. Owner sends C_o to KDCs; 4. KDCs returns the requested SKs to Owner; 5. Owner signs the MSG with R, encrypts it by SKs and gets cipher text C, and then sends C and X to the TTP. In default, X_anonymity switch in X is set to 1. At this point, if Owner allows users to access data MSG directly, X_autonym switch in X must be set to 1, and then sends X_autonym to the TTP. 6. TTP converts X_anonymity to an AFG-based access control policy and send C and X to Cloud. Cloud verifies Owner's R and t, if passed, he stores C and the AFG-based access control policy in X, and also generates and stores the corresponding access control policy based on X_autonym.
2) DATA ACCESS STAGE a. When Reader/Writer access data directly, the interaction is shown in Fig. 5 (a) 1. Reader/Writer sends a read/write MSG request to the Cloud; 2. Cloud verifies the user's identity according to the access control policy generated by X_autonym. If passed, he sends C_r/C_w and C to the user; 3. Reader/Writer sends C_r/C_w to KDCs to get SKs; 4. Reader/Writer obtains SKs, then uses them decrypt C and read/write MSG; e. GUIDs are computed by the following formula ROUND (RAND() * 1000) + 1.
According to Table 1 , we check the above attribute grouping rule f (S Attr ). After calculation, the numbers of attribute values in the attribute groups of name, email, nations, VISA card number and provinces are 900, 900, 38, 900, 50 respectively. The entity set proportion Q/R = 1 > P. Hence, f (S Attr ) is feasible and can be used to convert entity identity, access control policy and access request.
A. USER REGISTRATION
Now we use the above scheme to group the anonymous registration users. Suppose that there are three users with anonymous registration request. Their attribute values are shown in Table 3 . According to the AFG method, the three users' attribute group numbers are shown in Table 4 . According to Definition 4, it is easy to get Alice ∈ SG 102,56,2,8,91 , Tom ∈ SG 66,20,1,9,6 , Lucy ∈ SG 56,30,2,17,103 . And then their fuzzy identifications are shown in Table 5 .
B. DATA CREATION
For a more intuitive representation, here we take an example, where Alice create data MSG1 directly and define data access statement which allows both accesses directly and anonymously. The statement is shown in Table 6 . In the direct data creation mode, Alice needs to send data MSG1 and X_autonym in the above statement to the cloud directly, then the cloud stores MSG1 and generates the direct access control policy based on X_autonym; Meanwhile, Alice needs to send X_anonymity to TTP, then TTP generates the AFG-based access control policy according to X_anonymity. The AFGbased access control policy on MSG1 is shown in Table 7 .
C. DATA ACCESS
When Alice, Tom, Lucy want to access MSG1 directly, they submit their requests to the CSP. The CSP responds these requests based on X_autonym in Table 6 . If Alice, Tom, Lucy want to access MSG1 anonymously, they will submit their requests to TTP. TTP transfers the requests based on their fuzzy identification and sends the converted VOLUME 6, 2018 requests to the CSP. The cloud responds the request based on X_anonymity in Table 6 .
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
This section gives a security analysis of PriGuarder.
A. USER DATA SECURITY
In PriGuarder, user's data MSG is signed by Identity Claim and encrypted by SKs from KDCs into a ciphertext C. and then the ciphertext C is added into a timestamp t and transferred in an encryption communication channel. If an attacker wants to get MSG, he must own SKs but the SKs transmission channel has high security. In addition, the timestamp t is introduced to prevent repeat attacks. Hence, it can improve user data security.
Moreover, there are two kinds of access statement X_autonym and X_anonymity. When the owner uploads ciphertext C, other users need to pass identity authentication from TTP. After the verification, TTP sends credentials to users so that they can obtain SKs to decrypt the ciphertext C. If a user can't be authenticated, he can't decrypt C. It is difficult to learn access protocol and the encryption algorithm, so user data security is guaranteed.
B. USER PRIVACY
In anonymous access process, a CSP only can record the converted fuzzy identification of cloud users and does not know user's other information, so user's identity and attribute leakage caused by curious CSPs can be avoided. We take two security threats into consideration as follows.
1. Under the premise that both the files manipulated by a user and legal users' attributes to access the files are known, an attacker wants to learn single or all attribute values of the user.
In this situation, the following conclusions is obviously drawn. We omit their proofs.
Proposition 1: For s = (sa 1 , sa 2 , . . . , sa l ) ∈ SG x,y,...,z , sa i ∈ Dom(SA i ) m (i ∈ {1, . . . , l}, m ∈ {x, y, . . . , z}), suppose that there are q i attribute values in Dom(SA i ) m and an attacker knows the relationship between an attribute group number and the corresponding attributes values sets. The attacker must match q i times to learn the users' attribute value sa i .
Proposition 2: −1) , where n i is the string length and j is the number of strings in character string tuple of sa i as stated in Section IV.B.
Proofs: For each attribute value sa i (i = 1, l, l, l ∈ N ), as stated in Section IV.B, its ASCII tuple is (b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b j ) after ASCII conversion with n i . After Double modulo operators, the attribute group number g i of sa i is computed as the above formula (2) . g i is derived as follows.
Here f is the maximum ASCII number among the character string tuples of all sa i . Since the character 'Z' with ASCII code 122, f equals to 122122122 . . . Theorem 2 illustrates that the more string length n i and number of strings j an attribute value contains, the greater computational complexity of learning a user's all attribute values is, and then the more secure user identity or attribute privacy is.
C. CORRELATION SECURITY BETWEEN USER DATA AND IDENTITY
As mentioned in the above, a CSP processes transaction only based on a user's fuzzy identification in anonymous access mode. When a user accesses his data, the CSP cannot obtain the user's real identity and attribute information. Hence, it can cut off the relevance between users' data and his identity in Cloud system. It can prevent malicious CSPs or others from peeking users' operation and doing any malicious things.
VII. EVALUATION
We compare PriGuarder with the existing access control methods and conduct some comprehensive simulations to test the performance of the proposed method.
A. FUNCTION ANALYSIS
We have compared PriGuarder with other existing access control technologies on functions, including fine-grained, centralized or decentralized, privacy protection and replay attack prevented etc. As listed in Table 8 , PriGuarder can support flexible, fine-grained and distributed cloud services access control. The added timestamp can enhance network communication security and prevent malicious replay attacks. The AFG scheme can protect users' identity and attribute privacy.
B. EXPERIMENTS
Because the AFG scheme is the core of PriGuarder, we test the performance stability of the AFG scheme. 
1) EXPERIMENTAL ENVIRONMENT
We have implemented the AFG scheme with Python and deployed it in the machine with configuration of Intel (R) Core (TM) i5-3337 -u CPU@1.80GHz processor. We finished the experiments in the example stated in Section V. That means, each user has 10 attribute types including email, user name, full name, company name, country, address, nationality, Zip, Phone, VISA card number.
2) PERFORMANCE OF AFG SCHEME
In the first experiment, let the operational factor key = 171 and each attribute's expected group number W i be 111 and 277 respectively. We count the computing time of AFG scheme under different expected group number W i . As shown in Fig.6 , when the key is constant, with the increasing of W i , the computing time of AFG scheme has a slow increasing trend.
In the second experiment, let each attribute's expected group number W i = 171 and the operational factor key be 171 and 87 respectively. We count the computing time of AFG scheme under different operational factors key. As shown in Fig. 7 , when the W i is constant, with the increasing of key, the computing time of AFG method has a slow decreasing trend.
In summary, with the increasing number of users, the computation time of the AFG scheme increases. Meanwhile, the changes of operational factor key and each attribute's expect grouping number W i have a little influence on the whole attribute grouping algorithm. It shows that the AFG scheme has good performance stability.
We haven't compared the experimental performance with other work, i.e., group encryption scheme stated in [28] . Although the proposed AFG scheme and group encryption schemes both use grouping concepts, but their goals are completely different. Group encryption scheme is usually used to solve the information security sharing problem in a group. Its goal is to generate a public group key that is only known by group members. However, our goal is to protect attribute privacy of a cloud user from leaking in three stages of a cloud service. To do this, an attribute value of a cloud user is grouped based on its string format, the fuzzy identification for a cloud user is constructed based on his attribute group number GID. In a sense, GID can be considered a cipher text for attributes value of a cloud user. The above theoretical analysis has shown that a cloud user's attributes cannot be derived from the cipher text GID in proposed AFG scheme.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
To ensure data privacy, we propose PriGuarder which spans the three stages of a cloud service, i.e., user registration, data creation and data access. At each stage, users can choose two modes to interact with CSP, i.e., direct or indirect. With the indirect mode, an Attribute Fuzzy Grouping scheme is introduced to ensure user identity privacy and attribute privacy in all the three stages. Furthermore, exploiting data encryption and timestamp techniques, new access control protocols are proposed to regulate interactions between users and CSPs.
However, some problems are not covered in this paper. On the one hand, more efforts should be made to support a more complex trust model, which tackles such situations as a malicious TTP that attempts to reveal users' privacy. On the other hand, our ongoing research will study tradeoffs among qualities of cloud service and privacy protection, some of which may be complementary to PriGuarder. 
